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‘Emaciated’ Defense or a Trend to Independence and Equality of Arms in
Internationalized Criminal Tribunals?

T

he commencement of the trial of Charles Taylor, the
former president of Liberia charged with international
crimes by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, was to be a
momentous occasion. It was billed as a rare moment of international accountability, with a former head of state facing trial on
eleven charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity for
his alleged criminal assistance to rebel forces in Sierra Leone.
The trial was moved from the Special Court’s site in Freetown,
Sierra Leone to The Hague, Netherlands, for security reasons.
But when the prosecution’s opening statement commenced as
scheduled on June 4, 2007, the accused was not in the courtroom. Presiding Justice Julia Sebutinde, a British-trained judge
from Uganda, immediately took note of the defendant’s absence
but proceeded to recognize the other relevant actors in the courtroom. They included a prosecution team of seven lawyers, the
defendant’s assigned counsel, Karim Khan, and Duty Counsel
from the Office of the Principal Defender Charles Jalloh. Khan
had been assigned to represent Taylor more than a year before
because Taylor was determined to be “partially indigent,” meaning that he was without sufficient funds to hire counsel, but that
if assets were recovered, he would be required to contribute to
the costs of counsel.
The focus of the hearing quickly moved from the prosecution’s opening statement to the defendant’s absence. The day
became a protracted standoff between the judges and defense
counsel, with a scenario that culminated in Khan leaving the
courtroom despite the threat of contempt of court. This short
article examines the Taylor trial skirmish over defense counsel
and its aftermath as a paradigmatic example of the ongoing
struggle to define rules and structures to protect the independence of defense counsel, and the defense office in general,
in international criminal tribunals. In addition to the work of
defense counsel in the Sierra Leone tribunal, this article also
will examine the structures of defense offices in the War Crimes
Chamber of the Court for Bosnia and Herzegovina, set up in
2005, and the newly proposed tribunal for the trial of international crimes in Lebanon, approved by the UN Security Council
Resolution 1757, of May 10, 2007. Each of these “hybrid” or
internationalized tribunals — so-called because of their hybrid
blend of national and international rules, institutions, and personnel — have adopted more independent structures for the
provision of defense counsel than those available in either the
ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) or the International Criminal
Court (ICC). Yet there is little doubt that the issue of equality
of arms for defense counsel, particularly assigned counsel, will
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Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, arrested in April 2006, has
been appointed defense counsel by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

continue to be a contentious issue in future international criminal trials. Virtually all defense counsel in such tribunals have
been assigned, not retained.

Charles Taylor’s Trial
At the Taylor trial’s opening session in June, Khan attempted
to explain Taylor’s absence and his own corresponding duties
arising from his client’s express wishes. He relied on two lines
of argument. First, he asserted that although the court had, at
an earlier pre-trial conference in May, instructed that Taylor
be able to communicate directly with the Principal Defender
Vincent Nmehielle about Taylor’s concerns regarding “the
size and composition of his legal team,”1 that meeting had not
taken place. Taylor was being held in a Dutch detention facility
in nearby Scheveningen, a neighborhood of The Hague, while
the Principal Defender’s headquarters are located in Freetown,
Sierra Leone, where other trials were under way. Second, Taylor
himself sent a letter to the court, via his counsel, explaining his
decision not to appear. The letter states, in relevant part:
Justice is blind, justice pursues truth, justice is fair, justice
is immune to politics. It is not justice to preordain convictions or emaciate my defence to the extent that I’m unable
to launch an effective defence… . Today marks the start
of the trial against me. The Special Court’s administration
has been so dilatory that I have only one counsel to appear
on my behalf, one counsel against a Prosecution team fully
composed of nine lawyers. This is neither fair nor just… .
It is therefore with great regret that I must decline to attend
any further hearings in this case until adequate time and
facilities are provided for my Defence team.

* Richard J. Wilson is Professor of Law and founding director of
the International Human Rights Law Clinic at American University,
Washington College of Law.
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The letter concludes with termination of instructions to
counsel, a request that counsel “cease to represent me before the
Special Court.” The court nonetheless ordered Khan to continue
to represent Taylor, invoking (incorrectly, in the author’s view)
the court’s Rules and Procedures regarding trial in the absence
of the accused. Khan correctly invoked the Code of Conduct
for defense counsel before the Special Court, which makes it
mandatory for defense counsel not to represent a client if representation has been terminated. The court nonetheless insisted
that Khan’s representation continue, at least by his presence in
the courtroom, asserting that the “Code of Conduct [could not]
override a court order.”
Counsel continued to argue after the court’s order, asserting
that the issue presented was one of first impression in the law
of the tribunal which needed to be properly adjudicated, but the
court was unmoved. The prosecution then began an opening
statement as Khan gathered his papers and books and stood to
leave. As he stood, shortly after the prosecutor had commenced
his statement, the court admonished:

proceedings until the end of June. No further mention was made
of the contempt threat against Khan, that day or later.
Taylor’s trial ground to a halt after the prosecution’s opening
statement. The Principal Defender flew to The Hague and met
with Taylor in late June. At a hearing on June 25, 2007 to update
the court on discussions with the accused, the court ordered the
Principal Defender Vincent Nmehielle to assign new counsel
to the accused, and further ordered the Registrar to ensure that
the Principal Defender was able to assign a lead counsel, two
co-counsel, and one senior investigator. At a brief hearing on
August 20, 2007, Taylor appeared with his new defense team,
led by Courtenay Griffiths, a Queen’s Counsel from England,
and two British co-counsel. During a recent status hearing in
early December, Griffiths indicated that the defense team now
totaled eleven members.2 At the request of the defense team,
Taylor’s trial resumed again on January 7, 2008, more than
seven months after the prosecution’s opening statement.

Lessons from the Taylor Trial
What are the lessons from this episode and its apparent
dénouement, as this first trial of an ex-president in Africa
finally resumed in January 2008? There are several. First,
Khan’s action in refusing to proceed as Taylor’s counsel, and
his courageous decision to leave the courtroom despite a court
order to the contrary, appear quite well founded in law and
ethics. This is borne out by his proper reliance on the code of
ethics for counsel before that tribunal, which required him to
stop all action on his former client’s behalf because his client
had terminated his services, and because he was “privy” to or
aware of those instructions. The court also abandoned its strong
threat of contempt. The judge’s inaction at least implicitly supported Khan’s decision. Second, the Duty Counsel system of the
Principal Defender Office provided the court with a convenient
and effective vehicle to “fill the gap” created by Khan’s absence
until new counsel could be found. Charles Jalloh, a young and
capable Sierra Leonean lawyer, handled the situation with poise
and confidence, stepping in on a moment’s notice, which is
just what his office was designed to do. Third, the seven month
delay in the proceedings was attributable almost exclusively to
the parsimonious actions of the Registrar in refusing to allow
the Principal Defender a simple round-trip air fare and related
travel expenses to The Hague to meet with Taylor. The actions
of the Registrar seem particularly misguided when one considers the extraordinary costs of moving the entire operation of
the Special Court from Freetown to The Hague, with scores of
personnel traveling on the Registrar’s budget for extended stays
there. Denying a single trip to the Principal Defender appeared
vindictive and small.
Fourth, and most important, Taylor’s complaints that his
defense team was “emaciated” — thin of representation by
counsel to the point of starvation — and that he was being
denied the right to adequate time and facilities for preparation
of his defense, are well-founded. The right to adequate time and
facilities for the defense to prepare, and adequate resources to
that end, are cornerstones of the right to a fair trial. The right
to equality of arms is a deeply established, and particularly apt,
precept in the European system for protection of human rights,
and one which has been imported into each of the international
and hybrid criminal tribunals.3 While that guarantee does not

Mr. Khan, you have not been given leave to withdraw. You
don’t just get up and waltz out of here. You have not been
permitted to leave . . . . There is a directive of this court
asking you to sit down and represent your client, which you
apparently have defied, and now you are walking out with
further defiance, without leave.

Khan responded, with great respect for the court “I am no
longer instructed in this case… . I’m trying not to be difficult; I’m trying to be principled. Your Honor, I’m privy to the
instructions of my client.” Khan left the room, pausing at the
door to state, “Your Honor, I must. I do apologize.”
The court immediately appointed Duty Counsel Charles
Jalloh to take over the defense of Taylor through opening statements. Jalloh willingly accepted. There followed a lengthy
opening statement from the prosecution, which took the rest of
the morning and much of the afternoon session that day. At the
close of the day’s proceedings, however, the court again raised
the issue alluded to in Khan’s morning argument, the inability
of the accused to speak directly to the Principal Defender. The
court couched the issue as “the matter of the fair-trial rights of
the accused, Mr. Taylor, who’s not with us in court today for one
reason or another.” The court noted, though without reference to
Khan’s arguments, that Taylor “had expected to speak with the
Principal Defender” after a prior pre-trial conference.
After much additional discussion and argument from Jalloh,
the Court allowed acting Registrar Herman von Hebel to make
a statement. Von Hebel bluntly stated that he “thought it was
not necessary” that Taylor meet with the Principal Defender,
and thus refused to fund the Principal Defender’s travel from
Freetown to The Hague. Presiding Judge Sebutinde paused a
moment, then stated wryly, “Well, that definitely sheds some
light on the reason why we find ourselves in this unhappy situation.” In a complete shift of direction, the court then found that
Taylor’s request to meet with the Principal Defender was “a
reasonable request and falls within his rights to do so. The office
of the Principal Defender was set up precisely for reasons like
that.” It ordered the Registrar to facilitate travel by the Principal
Defender to The Hague to meet with Taylor and adjourned the
7
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for assignment to the accused, and also hires the in-house staff
of Duty Counsel, who perform duties similar to that of Jalloh in
any of the cases before the court, particularly during the crucial
initial stages when an accused is without formally assigned
counsel and needs advice for initial appearance and other early
decisions. In addition, the office performs a number of roles in
administration, training, legal research, drafting assistance, and
outreach that none of the other defense structures offered until
this innovation.

Criminal Defense at the Bosnian War
Crimes Chamber
In some ways, the work of the defense office in Sierra
Leone parallels the work of the Criminal Defense Section of
the War Crimes Chamber (WCC) of the Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The WCC came into being in 2005 as a result of
the actions of the High Representative, an official position created under the Dayton Peace Agreement, as part of an overhaul
of the national justice system to allow it to try war crimes and
other international offenses in the local courts or by transfer
from the ICTY. This structure brings the WCC within the ambit
of other internationalized or hybrid courts.7
The Criminal Defense Section is known by its Bosnian acronym OKO (Odsjek Krivične Odbrane). The OKO has a director
with a professional staff, a nd like its counterpart in Sierra Leone,
it is the licensing authority for attorneys who wish to obtain an
appointment before the WCC. It provides legal and administrative support to defendants and advocates. For the defendant, this
can be as basic as advice on how to select a qualified defense
counsel, while for defense counsel, the office provides advice
and assistance in preparing submission of legal arguments, as
well as training courses on defense issues.8 The OKO is part of
the administrative structure of the court’s Registry; the director
of the office is selected by the Registrar and raises money for
the OKO.9

Taylor’s trial has raised issues about the adequacy of defense before
international criminal tribunals.

mean dollar-for-dollar parity with prosecution funding, the
defense must be provided with resources — time, space, library,
staff, and compensation — sufficient for the task. The actions of
the court, although not explicitly acknowledging their grounding in the concept of equality of arms, implicitly recognized the
premise by ultimately ordering significant additional funding for
the defense, and by Nmehielle’s appointment of a defense team
more nearly adequate to the challenges posed by the trial of a
former head of state.
Again, the court’s action seems to take place over the steadfast resistance of the Registrar, who had not adequately funded
the defense for trial until the court ordered it to do so. The
principle running through each of these last two observations,
a principle about the role of appointed defense counsel in any
tribunal, national or international, is that a structure for the provision of defense services that relies on the Registry of the court
for its funding or decision-making approval is hamstrung from
the outset and lacks that fundamental independence that is the
hallmark of an effective defense operation. The defense units in
the ICTY, ICTR and ICC are all situated within the Registry,
and selection and coordination of defense counsel are functions
of Registry personnel.4
This is not to suggest that the Office of the Principal Defender
in the Special Court for Sierra Leone is not “a step in the right
direction,” as one of the most recent and most comprehensive
reports on that office has found.5 As that and other studies have
pointed out, the Defense Office system brings a number of
important innovations to the organization of defense services in
internationalized criminal tribunals.

The Necessity of Independent Defense Offices
Independence is the key element that is lacking in both the
OKO and the Defense Office in Sierra Leone. When asked
to specifically rule on that issue, the Sierra Leone Appeals
Chamber made clear in Prosecutor v. Brima et al., that “the
Defence Office is not an independent organ of the Special Court,
as Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry
are,” and that the office is under the administrative authority
of the Registry.10 This lack of independence led the authors
of the War Crimes Studies Center report to offer, as their first
recommendation, that any future tribunal should “include the
establishment of an Independent Defence Office in the Statute
of the Tribunal.”11
That is exactly what the newest internationalized tribunal
does. Perhaps taking heed of prior experience, and just before
his retirement, Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed the
establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon in December
of 2006.12 When the Lebanese government could not reach
agreement on the structure of a tribunal, the Secretary-General
stepped in. For the first time, he proposed a tribunal of four
separate and independent organs: chambers (judges), the prosecutor, the registry, and the defense office. The head of the
defense office would be selected by the Secretary-General, and

The Importance of the Defense Office
Notably, there was no mention of the defense office in
the original agreement between Sierra Leone and the United
Nations (UN) setting up the Special Court. The office came
into being as a result of an agreement between the Registrar
and the court’s then-President, Justice Geoffrey Robertson. The
concept of a separate Defense Office grew and evolved, and
the office is recognized widely as “novel,” “innovative,” and
“unique.”6 It includes some separation from the Registry, in that
the Principal Defender selects lawyers to be placed on the list
8
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the office would be financed through the budget for the tribunal.
“The need for a defence office to protect the rights of suspects
and accused,” says the Secretary-General’s report, “has evolved
in the practice of the UN-based tribunals as part of the need to
ensure ‘equality of arms.’”13
On May 30, 2007, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1757, establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, by a vote
of 10-0, with five abstentions (China, Indonesia, Qatar, Russian
Federation, and South Africa).14 Debate on the resolution does
not reveal a single question about an independent defense office.
The resolution follows the recommendation of the SecretaryGeneral. Article 13 of the Statute for the Tribunal creates, for
the first time in UN history, an independent Defence Office,
whose director is to be appointed by the Secretary-General,
in consultation with the President of the Tribunal. The same
provision states that the Defence Office “may also include one
or more public defenders,” and will provide services similar to
those of the OKO in Bosnia and the Defence Office in Sierra
Leone.15 Should the Special Tribunal for Lebanon come into
being, the Defence Office will provide a model and precedent
for national and international justice. Such an office provides an

apt model for amendment of the Rome Statute of the ICC during
the review conference of States Parties in 2009.

Conclusion
From the very start of their operation, international
criminal tribunals have struggled with issues regarding the
independence of defense lawyers. In the Nuremberg trials and
subsequent proceedings, defense counsel complained that there
was not equality of arms between the prosecution and defense.
The ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
have struggled with structural issues in the provision of defense
services, including fee-splitting between counsel and clients
and other embarrassing ethical lapses by defense counsel. The
UN has shown foresight and common sense in moving away
from a defense office that works under the thumb of the registry
and toward a truly independent structure for defense services,
a structure that is, because of defense counsel’s true independence, more likely to assure fair proceedings and carefully
reasoned, sound outcomes. The system of international criminal
justice deserves no less.
HRB
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